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Article 2

China's Unequal Treaties

Rule of Law and China's Unequal Treaties:
Conceptions of the Rule of Law and
Its Role in Chinese International Law
and Diplomatic Relations in the Early
Twentieth Century
Mitchell Chan
The unequal treaties that hindered Chinese international
relations for much of the one hundred years immediately
preceding the Second World War reflected the differences
between the traditional Chinese legal system and those in Europe
and America. Traditional Chinese law has been characterized as a
morals-based system of philosophy and morality, a system of rule
by virtue rather than rule of law. The belief that the rule of law,
if not law itself, was either inadequate or nonexistent in China
shaped pre-modern China’s relationships with the world. At the
same time, the introduction of foreign legal thought, facilitated
by a wave of legal translation in China, exposed the Chinese to
foreign notions of law, including principles of international law
and the rule of law. Whether they believed the foreign conviction
that they had no law, realized they needed to play along with the
foreign view in order to restore China’s place in the world, or
simply favored the foreign definition of the rule of law more than
the traditional Chinese conceptions of law, Chinese thinkers in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries advocated, and
pursued, legal reforms shaped by international standards for the
rule of law. However, the philosophical and political texts that
influenced traditional Chinese law contained much material
that in modern parlance would fall under the umbrella of “law.”
Though rulers, politics, and policies changed over the centuries,
an ancient philosophical debate on the proper way to govern
provided an intellectual framework that remained influential.1
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In the nineteenth century, this model of traditional
Chinese law became an obstacle in China’s relations with the
great powers of Europe and America. Concern that Chinese
law provided inadequate protection for the rights of foreign
nationals prompted many foreign countries to negotiate treaties
with China that granted them significant diplomatic, economic,
and legal privileges but seldom extended similar privileges
internationally to China. In the early twentieth century, as the
Chinese embraced legal reforms and foreign legal knowledge,
they tried to use international law to challenge unequal treaties.
This demonstrated that while China had its own longstanding
traditions of legal thought, contact with foreign countries
introduced the Chinese to new ways of thinking about law,
which also influenced their view of the proper way to govern
and achieve order. On the international level, the concept of the
rule of law became an important component in early-twentiethcentury China’s diplomatic efforts to restore sovereign rights that
it had lost in the unequal treaties of the previous century.
Defining the Rule of Law:
Comparing the origins of law between legal systems
Before discussing the role of the rule of law in Chinese
international law, it is necessary to first examine where the term
“rule of law” comes from and what it means. Although the OED
dates the term “rule of law” to about 1500,2 use of the phrase in
English is usually traced to the 1885 Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution by legal scholar A. V. Dicey. Dicey
argued that the rule of law was peculiar to the common law of
England and one of British society’s defining characteristics.3
The concept of the rule of law is deeply rooted in the English
common law tradition:
At some times we have seen them depressed by
overbearing and tyrannical princes; at others so
10
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luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worse
state than tyranny itself, as any government is
better than none at all. But the vigour of our
free constitution has always delivered the nation
from these embarrassments, and as soon as the
convulsions consequent on the struggle have
been over, the balance of our rights and liberties
has settled to its proper level.4
Though Dicey described the rule of law as peculiarly
Anglo-Saxon, the concept of the rule of law can be found in
other cultures. The ancient Greeks and Romans placed great
importance on law as a check on government. Aristotle wrote in
Politics that “it is more proper that law should govern than any
one of the citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous
to place the supreme power in some particular persons, they
should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants of
the laws.”5 Roman orator Cicero drew a subtle but powerful
connection between the law and those charged with enforcing it:
“the magistrate is a speaking law, and the law a silent magistrate.”6
In the civil law tradition prevalent in Continental Europe, the
concept of rule of law is roughly equivalent to the German
Rechtsstaat and French état de droit. Both terms are generally
translated and thought of as the rule of law.7
Applying such a comparison with Chinese law is less
straightforward. To begin with, there is no Chinese word that
exactly translates as “rule of law” (in English or any other
language). The conventional Chinese term for “rule of law” is
fazhi, a compound word made from the characters fa (in this
case meaning “law,” but can also mean “fair” or “just”) and zhi
(meaning “to govern”). Thus, rule of law could be understood in
Chinese as “to govern fairly” or “to govern justly.” Already, the
exactitude of the term has begun to lose its precise meaning.
This confusion is compounded by the fact that the
word “law,” as it is understood in the European languages, also
Penn History Review
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has no direct translation in the Chinese language.8 The result
is that several distinct Chinese words are often simultaneously
(and interchangeably) translated as “law” even though they
have different meanings. Already we have seen the confusion
surrounding the word fa, which means “fair” or “just” but can also
mean “method” or “statute,” and in some cases “law.” Other words
for “law” that can have additional meanings include lü (“model”),
li (“ritual” or “morality”), xing (“punishment”), zhi (“control”),
and de (“virtue”).9 So someone talking about fazhi could well be
talking about “just control” or “fair method,” but not “rule of law.”
The linguistics underscore the additional challenge of applying a
European legal construct to a non-European culture.10 Although
the rule of law in Western legal systems is typically associated
with democratic political ideas, classical liberal democracy, and
ideas of constitutional government, this is a Western connotation
based on European and American experiences of the relationship
between law and government.11 How the rule of law looks in
practice depends on the political context of a specific society, and
the contexts of the rule of law in European legal history are very
different from those of fazhi in Chinese legal history.
Variations of the Rule of Law in Chinese Legal History:
The Imperial Confucian model of traditional Chinese law
Understanding the origins of fazhi thus depends on
understanding the origins of law in China. The historical
development of traditional Chinese law was shaped by centurieslong philosophical debates about the proper way to lead and
govern—what might be termed political philosophy. Two schools
of philosophical thought, Confucianism and Legalism, had a
particularly significant influence in shaping the development of
traditional Chinese law. In discussing the two schools, it helps
that each had its own set of Chinese words to describe specific
legal concepts that were central to their respective philosophies.
Although neither school was explicitly a legal tradition, each had
12
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its own views on how society should be governed and the role of
law in societal ordering.
The Confucian school was grounded in the concept of
li (meaning “morality,” though the word originally referred to
social rituals). Li emerged during the Western Zhou dynasty (c.
1046-771 BC), a period when ancient China was divided into
feudal vassal states that owed fealty to the Western Zhou kings.
The Duke of Zhou, regent for the second Western Zhou king,
developed the doctrine that heaven had given the king the right to
rule as long as he worked to “harmonize heaven with morality.”12
Thus, the Duke of Zhou turned li into a law-like form of control
over the activities of the nobility, whose loyalty and deference to
the king’s authority were necessary to maintain the feudal system.
Morality took on additional meanings centuries later
as the Zhou kings lost control over their increasingly rebellious
vassals, a period known as the Spring and Autumn period (771476 BC). During this period, Confucius (551-479 BC) took
inspiration from the Duke of Zhou’s use of li to govern the
nobility’s behavior and broadened it to apply to the behavior of
all social classes.13 Confucian philosophy linked government to
ethics, ethics to education, and education to social control. In the
Confucian model of government, rulers governed through li by
educating individuals who deviate from socially accepted rules
of behavior—the intention being that education would instill
culprits with li so that they did not break rules in the future. This
was how a government established and maintained control over
the people.14
In a Confucian society, it was crucial that political
leaders had superior morality to educate the people by example.
The Book of Rites, a Confucian classic text, describes the ruler’s
role not as administrator or lawmaker, but as that of role model:
“The demeanor of the son of Heaven15 should be characterized
by majesty; of the princes, by gravity; of the Great officers, by a
regulated composure; of (inferior) officers, by an easy alertness;
and of the common people, by simplicity and humility.”16 The
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13

China's Unequal Treaties

importance of the leader’s example in the Confucian school has
led to its view of li to be described as “rule by virtue” or “rule by
man.” This differs from the “rule of law” in that, significantly,
“rule by virtue” depended on the actions of a single powerful
leader. Rule by li was not what would be recognized as rule of
law.
The Legalist school opposed many core elements of
Confucian legal philosophy. Whereas Confucianism was based
on li, Legalism was based on fa (originally meant “methods” but
came to mean “human-made law”) and xing (“punishments”). In
952 BC, a nobleman called the Marquis of Lü, prepared a new
penal code that codified many existing criminal punishments
into a new set of laws. This document, called the Lü Xing, is one
of the oldest surviving legal codes in Chinese history.17 The Lü
Xing described the political purpose of creating penal laws:
All who became liable to those punishments were
dealt with without distinction, no difference
being made in favour of those who could offer
some excuse…Hence, (if anything more were
wanted), the clear adjudication of punishments
affected the regulation of the people, and helped
them observe the regular duties of life.18
Legalist philosophy maintained that humans were
persuaded not by morality and education, but rather by
punishment and reward.19 In this sense, the Legalist school
viewed law, especially penal law, as a political tool to control the
population. A commonly-cited summary of Legalist thought
comes from the Guanzi, a text traditionally attributed to Legalist
politician Guan Zhong, who advised that “The ruler creates the
law; the ministers abide by the law; and subjects are punished
by the law. All are subject to law.”20 The implication was that
everyone was somehow subjected to the authority of law, and this
was how rulers control behavior and maintain order in society.
14
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Traditional Chinese law, as it was practiced for most
of China’s history, is a fusion of legal ideas taken from the
Confucian and Legalist schools. When the State of Qin, one
of the former Zhou vassal states, completed its conquest of its
neighbors in 221 BC, its rulers embraced the Legalist school
and applied it zealously across their new territories, now ruled
as a unified empire under the Qin. However, the Qin applied
Legalist standards of punishment so severely that after the Qin
empire collapsed, Legalist philosophy was tainted by association
with the fallen regime. Under the succeeding Han dynasty (206
BC-AD 220), whose rulers took over the empire unified by Qin,
Confucianism became the state-sponsored school of thought
instead of Legalism.21 Legalist views, though officially banned,
did not disappear, however.22 Confucian historian Sima Qian,
writing in 94 BC after Qin’s fall, observed:
The Legalist school is stern and lacks compassion.
However, its rectification of the proper
relationship between ruler and his ministers, and
its insistence on the differentiation between the
superior and the subordinate, should be upheld
without change. The Legalist school does not
discriminate on the basis of closeness of personal
relationship or status of noble lineage but makes
decisions based uniformly on law. Thus, the
sentiments of kinship and respect are eradicated.
Such a way of conducting affairs can only be a
temporary expediency but cannot succeed in the
long term.23
The fusion of Legalist and Confucian conceptions of
law was in part a response to the desire of Emperor Wu of Han
(157-87 BC), widely considered one of the most ambitious
Chinese emperors, to establish a clear claim to rule. Educated
by Confucian scholars, Emperor Wu appreciated the Confucian
Penn History Review
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doctrine ruling involved “harmonizing heaven with morality.”
At the same time, Confucian scholars in the early Han period
did not always prove able public administrators. For the most
part, the individuals who possessed the bureaucratic skills and
experience needed to govern the unified empire were former
(Legalist) Qin officials.24 As a result, Legalist knowledge remained
an intellectual presence in the Han government. Additionally,
the Legalist belief in punishment as a deterrent against improper
behavior still compelled many administrators and many Han
officials understood that law and punishments were good ways
of achieving social control.25 Thus, Imperial Confucianism
combined the desired ends of Confucianism with the means
of Legalism. Imperial Confucianism gave official recognition
to the general idea behind Legalism, that punishments were a
realistic way of exercising social control. The difference was that
under Imperial Confucianism, the goal of law enforcement was
to promote a moral, harmonious society, not merely to punish
people for misbehaving.26
A remarkable thing about this new model was how long
it lasted. As a legal system, Imperial Confucianism lasted from
the early Han dynasty up until the end of Imperial China itself
with the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.27 The general nature
of imperial government and the overall manner in which the
country was governed remained largely consistent. If society
defines law as an institution for governing behavior that operates
independently from the individual wills of the rulers, then the
Imperial Confucian legal system was one of the oldest unbroken
legal systems in history.
Beginning of the Unequal Treaties
In the nineteenth century, the traditional Chinese legal
and political system had a rough awakening at the end of the
First Opium War (1839-1842) – a series of land and naval battles
between the United Kingdom and the Qing dynasty.28 While
16
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some contemporary observers identified trade issues, particularly
the right of British merchants in China to sell opium (officially
banned under Qing law) as the cause of the war, legal issues also
contributed to the British decision to dispatch a military force
to the Chinese coast in 1840.2930 In a February 1840 letter to
the Daoguang Emperor, then ruler of the Qing, British Foreign
Secretary Viscount Palmerston repeatedly identified concerns
about the nature of Chinese law:
Now if a Government makes a Law which applies
both to its own Subjects and to Foreigners,
such Government ought to enforce that Law
impartially or not at all. If it enforces that Law
on Foreigners, it is bound to enforce it also upon
its own Subjects; and it has no right to permit its
own Subjects to violate the Law with impunity,
and then to punish Foreigners for doing the very
same thing…
the British Government would not have
complained, if the Government of China, after
giving due notice of its altered intentions, had
proceeded to execute the Law of the Empire, and
had seized and confiscated all the opium which
they could find within the Chinese territory, and
which had been brought into that territory in
violation of the Law. The Chinese Government
had a right to do so, by means of its own officers,
and within its own territory…
But for some reason or other known only to the
Government of China, that Government did not
think proper to do this. But it determined to seize
peaceable British Merchants, instead of seizing
the contraband opium; to punish the innocent
Penn History Review
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for the guilty, and to make the sufferings of
the former, the means of compulsion upon the
latter; and it also resolved to force the British
Superintendent, who is an officer of the British
Crown, to become an instrument in the hands
of the Chinese Authorities for carrying into
execution the Laws of China, with which he had
nothing to do.31
The Qing dynasty found itself suing for peace by 1842
when it became clear that the country was in no position
militarily to continue fighting the British. The Qing official
sent by the emperor to negotiate the peace settlement, an
imperial clansman named Keying,32 did not receive any clear
guidance from the emperor for diplomatic objectives beyond
the withdrawal of British military forces from Qing territory.33
His bargaining position already weak following Chinese military
losses at British hands, Keying’s negotiations were not aided by
the fact that neither the emperor nor his foreign policy advisors
had a clear understanding or interest in the political, commercial,
and (yes) legal demands that the British wanted.34 The Daoguang
Emperor wrote to Keying during the negotiations that “the whole
business is trifling and tedious” and asked why the British did not
understand that “trade and commerce in different places should
go by the old rules and there is no need to make changes.”35
The 1842 negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Nanking,
signed on August 29, 1842, and the subsequent Treaty of the
Bogue in 1843 which supplemented and clarified the Treaty of
Nanking. This began a century-long trend of agreements in which
China was not treated as an equal negotiating party by foreign
“treaty powers,” who compelled the Chinese to make significant
concessions.3637 China entered into anywhere from five hundred
to over one thousand such unequal treaties during the 100 years
between the end of the First Opium War and the Second World
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War.3839

British War Ship sinking Chinese junks (sailing ships) in the Second Battle of
Chuenpi (January 7, 1841). Britain's victory in this battle started the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Nanking.

While the Treaty of Nanking (and many subsequent
treaties) addressed foreign rights to trade in China, the
negotiations surrounding the Treaty of Nanking also introduced
two important legal concepts that would feature in Chinese
debates on international law for the next century: most-favorednation status and extraterritoriality. The Most-Favored-Nation
Clause to the 1843 Treaty of the Bogue, added at the last minute
before the treaty was signed, was meant to ensure that any future
concessions China made to a different foreign country would
also be automatically accorded to the British.40 The MostFavored-Nation Clause in the Treaty of the Bogue provides:
“should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be
Penn History Review
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pleased to grant, additional privileges or immunities to any of
the subjects or Citizens of such Foreign Countries, the same
privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by
British Subjects.”41 The cascading effect of the Most-FavoredNation Clause ensured that unequal treaties became greater and
greater liabilities as more countries pressured China into entering
into similar treaties with them.
The importance of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause is
perhaps eclipsed by the still greater, and more notorious, concept
of extraterritoriality. Under extraterritoriality, the Chinese
government ceded its legal authority over foreign nationals
whose countries had treaties with China granting their nationals
extraterritorial rights in China. Foreign nationals whose countries
had such treaties remained subject to the laws of their home
country despite their physical presence on Chinese territory.42
As Palmerston’s letter to the Daoguang Emperor made plain,
the British had little confidence in the traditional Chinese legal
system to protect the safety, property, and interests of British
subjects living and trading in China. This concern prompted the
British, under diplomat and colonial administrator Sir Henry
Pottinger, to introduce a clause into the Treaty of the Bogue that
would allow British subjects in China to remain under British
law, not Chinese law.
Keying and other officials advising the Daoguang
Emperor, eager to simply resolve conflict with the foreigners,
agreed to this.43 However, this concession fundamentally altered
the Chinese government’s experience with foreign nationals.
Perhaps more than any other concession, the Qing dynasty’s
acquiescence to the British extraterritoriality clause in 1843 set
China up for a century of international inequality. Just a year
after the signing of the Treaty of the Bogue, Caleb Cushing,
United States Minister to China, demanded extraterritoriality
rights for American citizens in China.44 The resulting Treaty
of Wanghia between the Qing dynasty and the United States,
signed by Keying and Cushing on July 3, 1844, included a clause
20
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on extraterritoriality that closely mirrored its British counterpart
in the Treaty of the Bogue:
Regulation XIII of the General Regulations, part
of the Treaty of the Bogue:
Regarding the punishment of English criminals,
the English Government will enact the laws
necessary to attain that end, and the Consul will
be empowered to put them in force; and regarding
the punishment of Chinese criminals, these will
be tried and punished by their own laws.45
Article XXI of the Treaty of Wanghia:
Subjects of China who may be guilty of any
criminal acts towards citizens of the United
States, shall be arrested and punished by the
Chinese authorities according to the laws of
China: and citizens of the United States, who
may commit any crime in China, shall be subject
to be tried and punished only by the Consul, or
other public functionary of the United States,
thereto authorized according to the laws of the
United States.46
While immunity from local laws for foreign nationals
was not unheard of, such immunity was typically restricted to
diplomats and their families and staff.47 The extraterritorial rights
iterated in the Treaty of the Bogue and the Treaty of Wanghia
applied to all nationals of the countries named in the treaties.
Such arrangements deviated significantly from international
norms.48 They also differed from previous Chinese legal precedent
on criminal jurisdiction of foreign nationals:
The Chinese notion of territorial sovereignty
and jurisdiction, as entertained, though at times
Penn History Review
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vaguely, by the officials of the Empire in the early
days, was not essentially different from that which
is maintained by modern international jurists.
Within the territory of the Empire the imperial
laws were supreme; foreigners who went there
were permitted to stay only on sufferance; they
were under the same obligation as the Chinese
subjects to obey them and subject to the same
penalties enacted to punish their violation. This
notion was vigorously followed by the Chinese
rulers in their intercourse with the westerners.49
The loss of jurisdiction to such a significant degree within its
own borders highlights how the differences between traditional
Chinese law and the legal systems of countries like the Britain
and the United States were becoming an international liability for
China. The legal concerns in Palmerston’s letter to the Daoguang
Emperor50 and the significance of extraterritoriality in settling
questions of legal jurisdiction indicate that foreign attitudes
on the nature of law in China were key factors in the way they
interacted with China. Thus, it is important to understand
exactly what foreign, particularly European, observers of China
thought about its law and legal system.
Perhaps the earliest, and certainly the most far-reaching,
commentary on Chinese law in Europe comes from Montesquieu’s
The Spirit of the Laws in 1748.51 Montesquieu correctly identified
the Confucian model of rule by virtue, “a barrier which men
have placed within themselves to prevent the corruption of each
other…confounded their religion, laws, manners, and customs;
all these were morality, all these were virtue.”52 However,
Montesquieu viewed this form of lawmaking as despotic, “in
which laws “in vain did this arbitrary sway, laboring under its
own inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its
chains.”53
In the nineteenth century, rampant corruption and
22
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administrative incompetence in the late Qing period, though not
directly the result of the Imperial Confucian model of traditional
Chinese law, certainly contributed to negative foreign opinion
of Chinese law. In 1846, German missionary Karl Gützlaff, who
had translated for the British in the negotiations after the First
Opium War, wrote that Chinese magistrates had lost much of
their power to govern the local populace.54 Gützlaff observed two
important differences between nineteenth-century European
and Chinese criminal law: that defendants in Chinese criminal
trials were seldom represented by attorneys and that Chinese
magistrates appeared to possess almost unrestricted power when
issuing verdicts and criminal punishments. This power was easily
abused:
All evidence they may bring forward is listened
to; when, however, the actual trial takes place, the
prisoner is solely at the mercy of the Mandarin,
who pronounces his sentence unshackled by any
guide but his own will, and clothes it in legal
language, citing chapter and verse of the code.
Appeal to a higher court is perfectly legal, though
every step taken involves heavy expenses, and
the meanest individual may carry his case to the
Court of Requests at Peking. The proceedings in
the Court itself are very summary; the accused
appears, a few questions are put to him, and he
is instantly sentenced, without much reference to
his answers.55
This idea that Chinese law consisted of individual “legal”
pronouncements also extended to private or civil matters like the
regulation of trade. In the years leading up to the First Opium
War, British diplomats and merchants repeatedly expressed
frustration with what they saw as deliberate attempts by the Qing
government to restrict British trade and punitive measures to
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dissuade individuals (British or Chinese) who tried to maintain
that trade. An 1824 memoir by John Francis Davis, then an East
India Company employee based in Canton, the only Chinese
port in which foreign merchants could legally trade prior to the
Treaty of Nanking, described:
Any person at all acquainted with the early
history of our inter course with China, when
every separate ship of the Company transacted
its own business, and when that intercourse in
many points resembled what a free trade would
make it, must have been struck by the endless and
intolerable grievances to which we were subjected
by the Chinese, and which frequently reduced
us to the brink of giving up the commerce
altogether.56

Late Qing government official (also called a mandarin) presiding over court
proceedings, 1889
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Concerns that the Qing dynasty was making it
unreasonably difficult for British merchants to legally trade in
China have been identified as one of the major causes of the First
Opium War and Britain’s subsequent negotiation of the Treaty
of Nanking with China. Contemporary accounts of British trade
in China before the Treaty of Nanking frequently discuss the
Chinese legal environment surrounding foreign trade. Chinese
officials unfairly targeting British businesses and property are
recurring themes. In a report to Queen Victoria written after
the First Opium War, British colonial administrator Robert
Montgomery Martin noted that in January 1840, before the
war, the Qing government had made a law singling out British
subjects for special treatment:
[January 14th] brought an edict from the
Emperor, approving of all that had been done,
and ordering a distinction between to be made
in the future treatment between the English
and other nations. As to the petty duties paid
by the English, it was not to be deemed worth a
consideration. Foreigners of other nations were
ordered to be submissive, but if they sheltered or
protected the English, or conveyed them or their
property into Chinese harbors, their punishment
would be great.57
Britain’s decision to negotiate the Treaty of Nanking was
an effort to address these concerns and protect the rights and
property of British subjects in China. The British government’s
opinion of Chinese law as arbitrary and punitive, especially
after Chinese officials specifically targeted British subjects as
noted in Palmerston’s letter in 1842, meant that in their minds,
extraterritoriality was a necessary guarantee against the abuse of
government power, which the British believed Chinese law could
not provide.
Penn History Review

25

China's Unequal Treaties

Treaty powers often reiterated their extraterritorial rights
in successive treaties, clarifying or expanding the forms that
consular jurisdiction in China would take. This trend began with
the Treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858 in the modern-day city
of Tianjin (then spelled Tientsin). When the Treaty of Nanking
failed to improve trade and political relations with the Chinese,
Britain, aided by France and the United States, fought the Qing
again in the Second Opium War (also called the “Arrow War”).
The Treaty of Tientsin ended the first phase of this war, which
continued until 1860.58 Legal concerns featured prominently in
the treaty. The Qing signed two versions of the Treaty of Tientsin,
one with the United States and one with Britain. The American
version of the treaty, signed on June 18, 1858, included no less
than three articles on extraterritoriality and jurisdiction over
American citizens. Article XI reiterated the Treaty of Wanghia in
that Chinese subjects were subject to Chinese law and American
citizens were subject to American law. Article XXIV established
different legal protocols for Chinese and Americans seeking
redress for unpaid debts. Per the new treaty, Chinese subjects
who owed debts to American citizens could be pursued in both
Chinese courts and by American consular officials. An American
who owed debts to a Chinese individual, however, could only be
pursued through American consular authorities.59
The British version, signed on June 26, 1858, shortly
after its American counterpart, was somewhat more equal in
that it stated that British and Chinese authorities both had
responsibility for apprehending Chinese who owed debts to
Englishmen and vice versa,60 but this version still stated rather
unequivocally that “all questions in regard to rights, whether
of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the British authorities.”61 The British
version of the treaty also required the Qing government to “at all
times afford the fullest protection to the persons and property
of British subjects, whenever these shall have been subjected to
insult or violence. In all cases of incendiarism or robbery, the local
26
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authorities shall at once take the necessary steps for the recovery
of the stolen property, the suppression of disorder, and the arrest
of the guilty parties.”62 The treaty did not include any parallel
to this article that required British consular officials to protect
Chinese individuals and property to this degree should the guilty
party be a British subject, an important omission considering
that such an individual would be immune from arrest and
prosecution from Chinese authorities under extraterritoriality.
In an English-language memoir America, Through the
Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat, British-educated Chinese
lawyer Wu Tingfang, who served as Minister to the United
States under the Qing dynasty and later as Foreign Minister
of the Republic of China,63 highlighted a particularly unequal
set of treaties with the United States concerning Chinese
immigration. Throughout the late nineteenth century, American
laws increasingly restricted rights of Chinese to immigrate to the
United States, often contrary to treaties between the Qing and
the United States on the subject.64
In 1868, the United States and China had signed the
Burlingame Treaty, negotiated by United States Secretary of State
William H. Seward and United States Minister to China Anson
Burlingame, the latter for whom the treaty was named. The
Burlingame Treaty was probably the first treaty that the China
signed which was not completely unequal, giving the Qing an
unprecedented number of concessions from the United States
government.65 These included broad legal rights for Chinese to
settle and trade in the United States:
The United States of America and the Emperor
of China cordially recognize the inherent and
inalienable right of man to change his home and
allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the
free migration and emigration of their citizens
and subjects respectively from the one country
to the other, for purposes of curiosity, of trade,
Penn History Review
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or as permanent residents. The high contracting
parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other
than an entirely voluntary emigration for these
purposes.66
Although ostensibly meant to prevent forced migration,
this wording was interpreted as allowing for Chinese immigration
and providing for Chinese rights of residence in the United States
that mirrored those given to American citizens in China by the
Treaty of Wanghia.67 Even more remarkably, the Burlingame
Treaty reciprocated the most-favored-nation status that the
United States enjoyed in China. The treaty text itself uses the
word “reciprocally” when discussing most-favored-nation
status,68 which was this time given to the Chinese. Wu Tingfang
took great care to highlight Article VI of the Burlingame Treaty:
Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in
China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities
or exemptions in respect to travel or residence as
may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects
of the most favored nation, and reciprocally,
Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the
United States, shall enjoy the same privileges,
immunities or exemptions in respect to travel or
residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens
or subjects of the most favored nation.69
Unfortunately, for China, the good news did not last.
Within a few years, the United States reneged on the promises
made in the Burlingame Treaty and asked the Qing dynasty
government to renegotiate the treaty. Wu Tingfang blamed
pressure from American labor unions to curb the immigration
of cheap Chinese labor for this reversal.70 In 1880, a renegotiated
treaty undid many of the reciprocal diplomatic and legal
concessions made by the United States to China.71 The Angell
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Treaty, named after James Burrill Angell, United States Minister
to China, did not hide that it was the United States who
unilaterally decided to replace the Burlingame Treaty and that
the Chinese reluctantly agreed despite having previously reached
an understanding with the United States.72 The 1880 treaty
preserved rights of residence and trade as well as most-favorednation status for five classes of Chinese subjects in the United
States—scholars, students, merchants, tourists, and Chinese
laborers already living in the United States—but gave the United
States government the unilateral right to “regulate, limit, or
suspend” all other types of Chinese immigrants to the United
States.73 This contradicted the United States’ previous insistence
on “the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home
and allegiance” stipulated in Article V of the Burlingame Treaty.74
In 1894, the United States asked the Chinese government
to revisit treaty provisions on immigration again. Between the
signing of the Angell Treaty in 1880 and the new round of
renegotiations in 1894, the United States Congress had passed
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 prohibiting immigration of
Chinese laborers to the United States for ten years. The Chinese
Exclusion Act did not mention the most-favored-nation rights
of Chinese subjects in the United States, nor did it make any
reference to the exempt classes of Chinese subjects named in
the Angell Treaty.75 While the Chinese Exclusion Act technically
called for a “suspension” of Chinese immigration rather than
an outright prohibition, which would have violated the Angell
Treaty,76 the Act had the practical effect of curbing a significant
amount of immigration.77 The 1882 act was extended for
another ten years in 1892, shortly before the United States began
negotiations for new treaty provisions.
The resulting treaty, called the Gresham-Yang Treaty after
the chief American and Chinese representatives who signed it,
supported Wu’s characterization of the Chinese Exclusion Act
as a “prohibition.” The Gresham-Yang Treaty instituted a tenyear ban on the immigration of Chinese laborers with only a
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few exceptions, including those Chinese laborers whose wives,
children, or parents already lived in the United States, as well as
the exempt classes under the Angell Treaty.7879 Wu described this
series of events as a contravention of both norms of international
law and other United States immigration laws:
What is most objectionable and unfair is that the
Chinese should be singled out for discrimination,
while all other Asiatics such as Japanese, Siamese,
and Malays are allowed to enter America and her
colonies without restraint…China does not wish
special treatment, she only asks that her people
shall be treated in the same way as the citizens or
subjects of other countries.80
China and the World:
The interaction and translation of foreign legal thought into
Chinese law and legal thought
The late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
witnessed a tremendous amount of legal translation in China
as Chinese-speaking jurists and translators produced Chinese
translations of major works of Western law, philosophy, politics,
history, and other subjects. In the context of legal translations,
the practice of translating texts on Western law, particularly
international law, into Chinese was known as yijie and is a major
component of early modern Chinese legal history.81 This high
period of legal translations coincided with a period of transition
in Chinese society, during which Western ideas gained influence;
As historian Herrlee Creel noted, “more and more Chinese came
to realize that it would be impossible to continue to enjoy their
traditional way of life, and at the same time to achieve the goal of
expelling the foreigner and winning China’s independence.”82
Concerted efforts at legal translation began during the
last decades of the Qing dynasty (relatively late by Chinese
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historical standards). In 1839, imperial commissioner Lin Zexu
commissioned a Chinese translation of Emerich de Vattel’s The
Law of Nations by American missionary Peter Parker and Chinese
imperial interpreter Yuan Dehui.83 Later, in 1862, the Qing
government established the Tongwenguan, a government school
in the imperial capital Beijing to promote Western knowledge
and languages, including the systematic translation of Western
legal texts into Chinese.84
One of the first major translations of Western law into
Chinese was American missionary W. A. P. Martin’s translation of
Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (wanguo gongfa,
literally “public law of foreign countries”) in 1864. Martin’s
translation broke new ground as one of the first Western texts on
international law to be translated into Chinese by introducing a
number of new terms into the Chinese legal language.85
A particularly interesting word that Martin created is the
term quanli (meaning “rights”). When Martin was translating in
1864, there was no direct Chinese translation for the English
word “rights.”86 Like the term fazhi (“rule of law”), quanli was
a compound word made from preexisting Chinese characters
that had other meanings: quan (meaning “power”) and li
(meaning “benefit” or “interest”; note this is a different Chinese
character than that for the Confucian term meaning “morality”).
Martin’s new term quanli was homophonous with another, more
established term quanli (written with a different character li)
that meant “authority” or “political power.”87 The word quan
(“power”) appears identically in both terms.
The association between power and rights was preserved
in the coining of yet another compound phrase, minquan
(meaning “people’s power”).88 During the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries, at the height of the yijie wave of legal
translations, political reformers such as Sun Yat-sen (18661925), Kang Youwei (1858-1927), and Liang Qichao (18731929) advocated the collective power of the people as a way to
strengthen the country politically. Liang, for example, wrote that
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as “rights consciousness gets increasingly developed, people’s
[political] duties become increasingly strong.”89 These reformers
were primarily concerned with building up China’s political
strength so that it could regain its sovereign rights and ultimately
get rid of its unequal treaties.9091 Rights and the people’s power
were meant to bolster the power of the state rather than protect
individual citizens from the state. Rights of the people collectively
were a step towards strengthening the country, which was why
“people’s power” was valued more than individual rights.92 It was
a means to an end, the end being the political development and
ultimately acceptance of China on the international stage.
Law and International Relations:
The Systematic Introduction of the Rule of Law to Foreign
Policy
Concessions in unequal treaties over the second half of
the nineteenth century made it harder for the Qing government,
already weakened by corruption and various rebellions against
imperial rule, to maintain control of the country. The unequal
treaties were an important factor in the ultimate collapse of
the Qing dynasty in 1912, whose demise marked the end of a
several-thousand-year-old imperial dynastic tradition.93 The new
regime, the Republic of China, was faced with a messy diplomatic
and legal situation. Yet between 1912 and 1943, a period less
than a third of a century, the Republic of China government
managed to renegotiate, revise, and ultimately replace all the
unequal treaties that crippled its predecessor. Learning from the
Qing dynasty’s struggles, the government of the new Republic
of China understood the importance of bringing China in line
with modern political, diplomatic, legal, and social norms.
Republic of China leaders understood that reforming China’s
legal system and bringing China in conformity with modern
norms of international law would solidify the new republican
regime’s political legitimacy, strengthening the Chinese state
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while restoring China’s status under the law of nations.94
Law and the rule of law were crucial to achieving these
objectives. There were two important connections between the
rule of law and the abolition of the unequal treaties. First was
that domestic legal reform would have the direct consequence of
satisfying a major condition for renegotiating extraterritoriality
in unequal treaties. Foreign dissatisfaction with the norms and
customs of traditional Chinese law had been the motivation
for pursuing and maintaining extraterritorial rights through
treaties, and the treaty powers had already indicated a willingness
to relinquish consular jurisdiction if there was a sufficiently
modernized Chinese legal system to take its place.9596
This important consideration was demonstrated in the
1902 negotiations for a new commercial treaty between the
Qing dynasty and Britain. The Chinese negotiators sent to
meet with the British this time understood that legal reforms
and reevaluating Chinese law from the perspective of foreigners’,
particularly Europeans’, understanding of law would be necessary
before the treaty powers would consider making concessions
to China. One of the Chinese negotiators, Zhang Zhidong,
raised this issue before the British: “We intend to reform our
legal system and will appoint commissioners to prepare for this
in the near future. Would you agree that, after our legal system
has been overhauled, all foreign nationals [in China] ought to
be subject to Chinese law?”97 The British subsequently pledged
in the Mackay Treaty, signed on September 5, 1902, that “Great
Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will
also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she
is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for
their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so
doing.”98 Thus, legal reform was a path towards the renegotiation
of unequal treaties.
The second reason was that international law was a
fundamental element to the Republic of China’s strategy for
eliminating unequal treaties. A new generation of Chinese
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international lawyers would gradually but successfully argue
on the international stage that the unequal treaties violated
China’s rights as a sovereign nation under international law and
that under international legal norms, revising and replacing the
treaties with more equal terms was the way to restore Chinese
sovereign rights to an equitable state.99
During the first fifteen years after the establishment
of the Republic of China, a period referred to as the Beiyang
government (1912-1927) because it was based in Beijing, the
government prioritized the study of international law as well
as the professionalization of the Chinese diplomatic corps as
ways of bringing Chinese foreign policy in line with accepted
international norms. The Beiyang government established a new
Chinese foreign ministry, called the Waijiaobu (literally meaning
“External Intersection Ministry” or “Diplomacy Ministry,” often
translated as “Ministry of Foreign Affairs”) in 1911.100 Under the
leadership of Lou Tseng-Tsiang,101 a former Qing diplomat who
later served four terms as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of China (1912, 1912-1913, 1915-1916, 1917-1920), the new
foreign ministry became a modernized government bureaucracy
whose leaders had lived overseas, could speak foreign languages,
and understood how foreign powers practiced international
relations.102 Foreign-educated diplomats and lawyers comprised
the bulk of Waijiaobu leaders: of the fourteen men who served
as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Beiyang government,
nine had been educated in the United States, Britain, Japan, or
Germany.103 The recruitment of well-educated, cosmopolitan, and
multilingual officials, hired through regular entry examinations,
lent a degree of professionalism and prestige to the Waijiaobu as
a competent and specialized institution for conducting Chinese
diplomacy.104 The internationalism and professionalism of this
foreign ministry attracted the attention of foreign countries and
provided a sturdy foundation for subsequent Chinese efforts
to conform with international standards of diplomacy and
international law.
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The use of law to persuade treaty powers to renegotiate
unequal treaties required familiarity with international law and
an understanding of foreign legal systems, knowledge that many
Republic of China diplomats possessed. International lawyers held
significant influence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout
the early twentieth century. China’s efforts to renegotiate and
replace unequal treaties gave Chinese international lawyers a
platform to broadly apply their legal training and understanding
of law to China’s foreign policy goals.105 The significance of
international lawyers in Chinese diplomacy persisted even after
the Beiyang government gave way to the Nationalist government

China: The Cake of Kings and Emperors, 1898.
Political cartoon depicting the treaty powers of Britian, Germany,
Russia, France, and Japan dividing China among themselves. China
is depicted as the cake.
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of Chiang Kai-shek. In 1935, lawyers comprised thirty percent
of prominent diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a
greater percentage than those who held doctoral degrees.106 These
legal credentials added further prestige, intellectual depth, and
professionalism to the practice of international law and ensured
that Chinese diplomacy was sufficiently well-informed about
legal matters to interact with treaty powers in an international
legal framework.107
The Shantung Question:
Revisiting and replacing unequal treaties through international
law
China’s first major attempt at using international law to
challenge an unequal treaty came during the First World War
(1914-1918). In 1914, Japan declared war on the German Empire
and subsequently invaded the German concession (territory
legally under Chinese sovereignty but occupied by another
through treaty rights) in the northern province of Shandong
(also spelled Shantung). The Japanese invasion and occupation
of Shandong violated the wartime neutrality that the Republic
of China had declared shortly after the First World War began
in Europe. In November 1914, Germany and its ally Austria
surrendered to Japanese forces in Shandong.108 After Germany’s
surrender, the Chinese government re-declared its wartime
neutrality and requested that Japan withdraw its troops from
Shandong Province. Japan refused. The Japanese government
subsequently pressured Yuan Shikai, President of the Republic
of China, to sign the Twenty-One Demands, an unequal treaty
that recognized Japanese rights to the former German concession
in Shandong.109 On May 7, 1915, Japan gave the Republic of
China an ultimatum: sign the treaty by May 9 or “the Imperial
Government will take steps they may deem necessary.”110
After the war, Japan put forward its claims to the German
concession in Shandong at the Paris Peace Conference (January
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18, 1919-January 21, 1920). When Japan cited the Twenty-One
Demands, the Chinese delegation at the conference rejected
Japan’s argument, countering that Yuan had signed the treaty
with Japan under coercion in wartime. The immediate threat
posed by Japanese troops already in Shandong had prevented
the Chinese government from finding an alternative, mutually
agreeable diplomatic solution back in 1915:
Although threatened by the presence of large
bodies of troops dispatched by the Japanese
Government to South Manchuria and
Shantung – whose withdrawal, the Japanese
Minister at Peking declared in reply to a direct
inquiry by the Chinese Government, they
would not be effected “until the negotiations
could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion”
– the Chinese Government issued an official
statement immediately after this satisfactory
conclusion” had been effected under pressure of
the Ultimatum of May 7, 1915, declaring that
they were “constrained to comply in full with the
terms of the Ultimatum[.]”111
The Chinese delegation also attempted to make a
constitutional argument that the treaties were not binding under
domestic Chinese law because they had not been ratified by the
Chinese legislature.112 The 1912 Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of China required legislative approval for all treaties to
be valid.113 However, the revised constitution of 1914 allowed the
President of the Republic of China to unilaterally make treaties
except when said treaty involved either a “territorial change” or an
“increase of the burden of nationals.”114 Since foreign concessions
were technically still Chinese territory and shifting extraterritorial
rights in the concession between Germany and Japan had not
caused any additional adverse effect on Chinese nationals, the
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Twenty-One Demands did not fit either of these exceptions, so
the constitutional argument against Yuan Shikai’s acceptance
of the treaty with Japan was weak. Nevertheless, the use of this
argument at the Paris Peace Conference set a precedent in China
for abolishing treaties by constitutionally-provided for legislative
action. The Republic of China would ultimately use this tactic
during the Second World War, when the Chinese legislature
voted to cancel all treaties between China and Japan.115
The Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference
made an additional claim against the Twenty-One Demands using
the legal principle rebus sic stantibus (Latin for “a fundamental
change in circumstances”).116 Under rebus sic stantibus, changes
in circumstances, such as the state of war between the Republic
of China and Germany after China entered the First World War
in 1917, meant that China could no longer justify the existence
of a German concession on its territory. Therefore, it was within
the Republic of China’s rights under international law to claim
the concession back despite having previously granted rights over
the territory to Germany.117 The Chinese added that had it not
been for Japan’s illegal action to claim the territory, “the leased
territory of Kiaochow would in any event have been directly
restored to China as one of the States associated with the Allied
Powers and the United States in the war against the Central
Powers.”118
Prior to the start of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919,
the Japanese government had enlisted diplomatic support for its
position on the Shantung Question from Britain and France. The
Republic of China tried to get support from the United States.
To this end, Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to the United
States, met with Woodrow Wilson in Washington. Wilson,
while offering general support for China, made it clear that
other countries had already made their own binding agreements
between themselves regarding the Shantung Question.119 In
a note to Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono Ichirō
on February 16, 1917, British Ambassador to Japan Conynham
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Greene confirmed the details of a deal between the British
government and Japan:
His Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure
to the request of the Japanese government for an
assurance that they will support Japan's claims
in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in
Shantung and possessions in Islands North of
Equator on the occasion of Peace Conference, it
being understood that the Japanese Government
will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same
spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands
South of Equator.120
In March 1917, Japan reached a similar agreement with France,
with the French agreeing to support Japanese claims in China
if the Japanese promised to pressure China into “rupturing”
diplomatic relations with Germany after the war. Such a “rupture”
would have included that China seize German ships located in
China ports and require that all German nationals leave Chinese
territory.121 It should be noted that the Chinese government was
not informed of this agreement between Japan and France.
While the Paris Peace Conference did see the end of
Germany’s extraterritorial rights in China, the conference did
not deliver China’s desired result on the Shantung Question. The
Treaty of Versailles that resulted from the Paris Peace Conference
gave control of the former German concession in Shandong to
Japan instead of returning the territory to China.122 The refusal of
the foreign powers to return the former German concession led to
the Republic of China’s refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles.123
The Chinese gave the following statement invoking international
law about the loss of Shandong:
The Peace Conference having denied China
justice in the settlement of the Shantung question
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and having today in effect prevented them from
signing the treaty without sacrificing their sense
of right, justice, and patriotic duty, the Chinese
Delegates submit their case to the impartial
judgement of the world.124
China’s loss, however, was short-lived. In 1922, the Republic of
China had another opportunity to rally international support on
the Shantung Question at the Washington Naval Conference.
The United States organized the Washington Naval Conference
(November 11, 1921-February 6, 1922) to address the future
of regional stability in East Asia and the Pacific. While the
agenda for the conference originally focused on the naval arms
race between the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Italy,
countries represented at the conference also discussed the future
of diplomatic relations in China.125
In 1922, China was in a better bargaining position than
it had been in 1919. The great powers in Europe and the United
States had become concerned about an increasingly aggressive
Japan.126 Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, an opponent of
the Treaty of Versailles’ handing Shandong to Japan, warned his
colleagues in the United States Senate:
The cunning Prussian of the Orient proposes to
get a title sanctioned, warranted, and guaranteed
by the league of nations with its holy seal affixed,
and then it will settle the question hereafter
whether it thinks that it is ready to give back this
property that it has taken. It is a good thing to
mix a little common sense even in our dreams.
He who thinks on this matter from the practical
standpoint of life must know that Japan, having
laid her hand of steel upon the throat of China,
does not intend to relax her grip.127
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Law has been an important influence on the development
of Chinese society at some of the most crucial periods in China’s
long history. The development of traditional Chinese law was
shaped by competing philosophical theories on the role of
human-made law in governance and social control. The Han
dynasty compromise between the virtuous moral objectives of
Confucianism and the practical enforcement mechanisms of
Legalism produced a type of legal system that endured the rise
and fall of a dozen successive dynasties. In the twentieth century,
international law gave China ways to renegotiate and ultimately
replace the unequal treaties that had held China down during the
previous century. Chinese desire for equitable treatment under
international law shaped China’s foreign policy for much of the
early twentieth century. Debates about the rule of law and the
role that law should play in the state are a common theme in
China’s history. Chinese law has had a rich history of fusion and
negotiation between people and ideas—much like China today.
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